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-

LIABILITY IN

TORT OF STOCKHOLDERS CON-

AFTER TAX FORFEITURE OF CHARTER. -

Defend-

ants, who were stockholders in X corporation, continued doing
business after their charter had been judicially revoked on suit
by the Attorney General under the state corporation license tax
statute' for failure to pay the license tax. The plaintiff sued the
defendants as partners for the death of his decedent through their
alleged negligence while in their employ. Defendants had not contributed to the Workmans Compensation Fund. Held, there was
neither a do jure nor a de facto corporation; the defendants were
individually liable as partners. Jones v. Young.2
The court had previously held that where a corporation's
charter had expired eleven years before the cause of action arose,
and the business was continued under the corporate form in the
interim, it was a de facto corporation and liable for its employee's
injuries as such.3 But in the principal case the do facto problem4
was eliminated by the court order judicially dissolving X corporation. If the plaintiff's decedent had been killed between the time
limit set by statute for the payment of the license tax, and the
judicial proceeding to dissolve the corporation, the case would be
stronger than the Miller case5 and would clearly permit recovery
as against the corporation since at the time of the wrong, its corporate existence was subject to challenge only by the state.
If in the principal case there were numerous stockholders who
were without notice of the dissolution decree, and did not participate in continuing the business, they should be treated like limited
partners. It has been held that where a shareholder had not participated in the management of the corporation after dissolution, he
could not be held liable as a partner6
In the principal case the judgment against the defendants,
IW. VA.

REV. CODE (1931), c. 11, art. 12, § 17.
2174 S. E. 885 (W. Va. 1934).
3 Miller v. Coal Co., 31 W. Va. 836, 8 S. E. 600, 13 Am. St. 903 (1888).
The court apparently based its opinion on the then existing statute which did
not provide procedure for judicial forfeiture as a condition precedent to dissolution for non-payment of license tax. But see Note (1927) 47 A. L. R.,
1288, 1395, n. 3, where it is said of this case: "It should be pointed out that
the effect of the expiration or forfeiture of a charter was not involved in
any of the cases relied upon by the West Virginia court. The omission to
advert to this aspect of the matter seriously impairs the weight of its
decision."I
4See, WARREN,

CORPORATE ADVANTAGES

WITHOUT

INCORPORATION

(1929)

683 et seq., for a helpful classification of do facto corporations.
5 upra n. 3.
6 Commercial National Baik v, Gillinsky, 142 Iowa 178, 120 N, W. 476
(1909),
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if docketed, would bind the property restored to the reinstated
corporation. Complications may arise, however, as to third parties
under the recodrding act, but the point is plain as between the
plaintiff and tl~e reinstated corporation. Might plaintiff have sued
the reinstated corporation? It has been held in a rather recent
case7 that one so situated may do so.
The analogy to successor corporations, whether it be a case of
merger, consolidation s or a sale of all the corporate assets," is not
perfect. In those situations the old corporation has disappeared entirely and, at least for present purposes, the surviving corporation
is deemed its juristic successor.20 Where a corporation succeeds
a partnership the individuals and their legal responsibility survive. It is true, in fact, that there is continuity in the business
from which the tort arose but not a legal continuity. In the
principal case, however, the reinstatement was more or less automatic and it seems desirable to permit suit against the reinstated
corporation.
-MORRIS S. FUNT.

COURTS -

JURISDICTION TO ANNUL LOCAL MARRIAGE OF NON-

RSIDETS. - A bill praying for the annulment of a marriage
alleged that both plaintiff and defendant were residents of P state;
that both were eighteen years of age at the time of the marriage
and that neither had the consent of a parent to the marriage. It
was further alleged that the matrimonial relationship was never
intended, nor consummated, and that they had never cohabited together as man and wife. The defendant filed a plea challenging
the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that both parties at
the time of the issuance of the writ were residents of P state, were
not and never have been residents of West Virginia, and that
plaintiff and defendant did at the time of the marriage reside in
7 Jones v. Francis, 70 Wash. 676, 127 Pac. 307 (1912).
Plaintiff, an employee was injured through the alleged negligence of the corporation after it
had been dissolved by the Secretary of State for non-payment of license tax.
Plaintiff sued defendants, who had continued to do business as a corporation, as trustees. Shortly after the plaintiff's injury, the corporation was
reinstated by ez parte proceedings brought by the defendants. The court in
holding the new corporation and the trustees liable declared it would be
overtechnical to deny liability.
a Louisville Ry. Co. v. Biddell, 112 Ky. 494, 66 S. IV. 34 (1902).
9 *Wolff v. Shreveport Gas, Electric Light and Power Co., 138 La. 743, 70
So. 789, L. R. A. 1916D, 1138 (1916).
10

See, 8 THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1928), 148, citing eases,
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